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A Debtor's Interest in ERISA Funds as
Property of the Estate: A Question of
Statutory Interpretation
Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore)'
I. INTRODUCTION
An interest in a retirement plan qualified under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA") 2 of 1974 may be one of a person's major
assets before filing a bankruptcy petition. How the Bankruptcy Code3 treats
that interest can have a great effect on the debtor's fresh start, on the amount
of payments made to general creditors, and on the decision to file a bankrupt-
cy petition. If the status of that interest is uncertain, the debtor may make the
wrong decisions or be forced into litigation to determine whether the turnover
of all or part of the debtor's interest in pension plan assets is required for the
satisfaction of creditors.
Currently, the United States circuit courts of appeals are divided on how
to treat a debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan. Several
circuits have excluded from property of the bankruptcy estate4 the debtor's
interest in ERISA qualified pension plans only if the plans qualified as
spendthrift trusts5 under state law.6 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
1. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1988).
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1320 (1988).
4. Property of the bankruptcy estate is defined as "all legal or equitable interests
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
(1988). The Code defines certain property that is excluded from property of the
bankruptcy estate and is thus never under the control of the trustee in bankruptcy. 11
U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). The Code also defines some property that becomes
property of the bankruptcy estate but is then allowed to be exempted out of the estate
by the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1988).
5. "A trust in which by the terms of the trust or by statute a valid restraint on the
voluntary and involuntary transfer of the interest of the beneficiary is imposed is a
spendthrift trust." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152(2) (1959). A self-settled
trust is a trust in which the settlor is a beneficiary. Id. § 114. The general rule is that
"[w]here a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a provision restraining the
voluntary or involuntary transfer of his interest, his transferee or creditors can reach
his interest." Id. § 156(1). This rule is bncause the settlor still retains control over the
corpus of the trust, such as the power to terminate the trust and receive the corpus.
6. See Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352, 1360
1
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recently took a contrary view in Anderson v. Raine (In re Moore). The
court held that the debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan was
excluded from property of the bankruptcy estate whether or not the plan was
a spendthrift trust under state law.8
I1. FAcrs AND HOLDING
Richard Allen Moore, Johnsie Dianne Moore, Stephen M. Haynes, Donna
Haynes, and Judy Dianne Thomasoif were the debtors in the underlying
bankruptcy case. The debtors were employees of Springs Industries, Inc., and
participated in Springs Industries' comprehensive retirement program.9 The
program consisted of a Profit-Sharing and Pension Plan and Trust and a
Retirement Plan and Trust ("Plans"). ° Robert F. Anderson was the trustee
in bankruptcy for the debtors' estates." Joseph S. Raine, Jr. was the plan
administrator for the Plans, and Northern Trust Company was the trustee for
the Plans.
The trustee in bankruptcy brought suit against the administrator of the
Plans seeking turnover of the debtors' interests in the Plans as property of
their bankruptcy estates.'2 Section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code 3
states that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor
in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is enforce-
able in a case under this title." 4 The administrator of the Plans claimed that
the debtors' interests in the Plans were excluded from property of the estate
because the Plans were qualified under ERISA and were therefore non-
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1985); Lichstrahl v. Banker's Trust (In
re Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th Cir. 1985); Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff), 706
F.2d 574,589 (5th Cir. 1983). Compare with Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726
F.2d 1268, 1272 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that ERISA plans are presumed to be part of
bankruptcy estate).
7. 907 F.2d 1476 (4th Cir. 1990).
8. Id. at 1477.
9. Id. at 1476-77.
10. Id. at 1476. The Plans were qualified under ERISA. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1477.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2).
[Vol. 56
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alienable.' s The trustee in bankruptcy claimed that section 541(c)(2) only
applied to state spendthrift trusts.' 6
The bankruptcy court found that the debtors interests in the Plans were
non-alienable, and therefore, were excluded from property of the bankruptcy
estate under section 541(c)(2). 7 The court thus found that the debtors'
interests in the Plans were not subject to transfer to the trustee in bankrupt-
cy.'8 The district court affirmed, and the trustee in bankruptcy appealed. 9
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the plain language of
section 541(c)(2) required the statute to apply to federal as well as state
law.20 The court found that the legislative history was irrelevant when the
meaning of the statute was clear, and even if considered, the legislative history
was inconclusive.2' The court therefore found that "'applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law' is not limited to state spendthrift trust law," 22 and the debtors'
interests in the Plans were not the property of the bankruptcy estates and were
not subject to turnover to the trustee in bankruptcy.'
HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Enforceability of ERISA Restrictions on Alienation
"The great weight of authority is to the effect that a debtor's interest in
an ERISA pension fund is beyond the reach of his general creditors."'' The
bankruptcy court in Liscinski v. Mosley (In re Mosley) 5 considered whether
ERISA created a federal prohibition on attachment of benefits under a
qualified ERISA plan.26 The court rejected the argument that because other
federal statutes that create an exemption from creditors are more explicit,
Congress intended to leave the interpretation of the required language in
15. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1477. ERISA requires in 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988)
that each pension plan contain language preventing transfer of benefits under the plan.
See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.





21. Id. at 1478-79.
22. Id. at 1477.
23. Id. at 1476.
24. Clotfelter v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927, 929 (D.
Kan. 1982) (citations omitted).
25. 42 Bankr. 181 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1984).
26. Id. at 188-90.
1991]
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ERISA plans to state lawY Hence, the court found that the state law
preemption in ERISArs indicated that.Congress did not intend to have state
law determine whether the benefits of an ERISA qualified plan were beyond
the reach of general creditors.2
In Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund,3" the United
States Supreme Court recently discussed ERISA's restriction on alienation.
Curtis Guidry pleaded guilty to embezzling funds from the Sheet Metal
Workers International Association, Local 9 ("Union"). 3' In a subsequent suit
Guidry and the Union stipulated to a judgment for the Union and against
Guidry of $275,000.32 The district court imposed a constructive trust on
Guidry's interest in ERISA qualified pension funds in favor of the Union.33
The Supreme Court held that ERISA's "statutory restrictions on assignment
2i. Id. at 188-89. To be qualified under ERISA, "[e]ach pension plan shall
provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29
U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). Further, "[a] trust shall not constitute a
qualified trust under this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 26 U.S.C.
§ 401(a)(13) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). The Treasury Regulations state as follows:
Under section 401(a)(13), a trust will not be qualified unless the plan of
which the trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may
not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or subject
to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or equitable
process.
26 C.F.R. § 1.403(a)-13(b) (1989).
Compare ERISA restrictions to other federal statutes that state that "[p]ayment
of benefits ... shall not be assignable ... and... shall be exempt from the claim of
creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal
or equitable process." 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1988). Similarly, "[n]o assignment, release,
or commutation of compensation or benefits.., shall be valid, and such compensation
or benefits shall be exempt from all claims of creditors and from levy, execution, and
attachment or other remedy for recovery or collection of a debt." 33 U.S.C. § 916
(1988). See In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 585 (5th Cir. 1983).
28. ERISA states the following:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under
section 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
29. Mosley, 42 Bankr. at 189.
30. 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990).
31. Id. at 682.
32. Id. at 682-83.
33. Id. at 684.
[Vol. 56
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or alienation of pension benefits appl[ied] to garnishment" by creditors.'
The Court decided that any exceptions to ERISA's restrictions on alienation
were for Congress to create, not the courts.35 The court held that the
constructive trust the district court imposed violated ERISA's restrictions on
alienation.36
B. Interpretation of 'Applicable Nonbankruptcy Law"
Before the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code") in 1978, a
debtor's interest in a spendthrift trust was excluded from property of the
bankruptcy estate if the spendthrift trust was enforceable under state law.37
The Code created a broad definition of property of the estate,38 but allowed
the debtor's interest in certain trusts to be excluded from this definition under
section 541(c)(2). This exclusion is still present in the Code. Therefore, the
question of whether a debtor's interest in a qualified ERISA pension plan
becomes property of the estate is determined by the court's interpretation of
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" as used in section 541(c)(2).
The circuit courts of appeals that have addressed this issue have
generally relied on the legislative history of the Code to determine the
meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law."39 Every circuit court of appeals
that considered this issue before Moore determined that "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law" only applied to spendthrift trusts and did not include ERISA plans
that did not qualify as spendthrift trusts under state law.40 The legislative
history relied on by these courts states that section 541(c)(2) "continues over
the exclusion from property of the estate of the debtor's interest in a
spendthrift trust to the extent the trust is protected from creditors under
applicable state law.",41
34. Id. at 685.
35. Id. at 687. The court noted that Congress provided that ERISA's restrictions
on alienation would not apply to a "qualified domestic relations order" under 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). Id.
36. Id.
37. Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726 F.2d 1268, 1271 (8th Cir. 1984).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988). See supra note 4.
39. See Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel), 771 F.2d 1352 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Banker's Trust (In re
Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11th Cir. 1985); Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272; Goff
v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 589 (5th Cir. 1983).
40. Daniel, 771 F.2d at 1359.
41. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 176, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6136. The legislative history also states that
§ 541(c)(2) "preserves restrictions on transfer of a spendthrift trust to the extent that
the restriction is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law." 1d. at 369, 1978
1991]
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Additionally, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Samore v. Graham
(In re Graham)42 considered the relation between section 522(d)43 and
section 541(c)(2) of the Code in determining the meaning of "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law."'  The court stated that because pension benefits were specifical-
ly. included in the list of exempt property, Congress clearly indicated that a
debtor's ERISA plan benefits "were intended and assumed to be part of the
estate."45  The Eighth Circuit used this reasoning again in Humphrey v.
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6325. The history further states that
§ 541(c)(2) "preserves restrictions on a transfer of a spendthrift trust." S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 83, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
5787, .5869.
42. 726 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1984).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code states that the following
property may be exempted from property of the estate:
(10) The debtor's right to receive-
(E) a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profitsharing,
annuity, or similar plan or contract on account of illness,
disability, death, age, or length of service, to the extent reason-
ably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent
of the debtor, unless-
(i) such plan or contract was established by or under
the auspices of an insider that employed the debtor at
the time the debtor's rights under such plan or
contract arose;
(ii) such payment is on account of age or length of
service; and
(iii) such plan or contract does not qualify under
section 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 401(a),
403(a), 403(b), 408, or 409).
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10) (1988).
44. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1272.
45. Id. But see Goff v. Taylor (In re Goff), 706 F.2d 574, 587 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Goff the court stated the following:
[s]ection 522(d)(10)(E) reaches a broad array of employment benefits, and
exempts both qualified and unqualified pension plans, to the extent such
benefits are reasonably. necessary for the support of debtor and his
dependents. Given this much broader exemption of benefits available only
to those making a federal election, we find no reason to doubt that ERISA-
qualified pension funds are included in Section 541 if they qualify as
spendthrift trust plans under state law.
Goff, 706 F.2d at 587 (footnote omitted).
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss3/9
DEBTOR'S INTEREST IN ERISA FUNDS
Buckley (In re Swanson).' In Humphrey, the court found that alienation
restrictions on a state-created pension fund did not qualify as "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2) because section 522(d)(10)(E)
deals specifically with pension funds.47 The court in Graham also reasoned
that because "ERISA specifically provides that its provisions were not to
affect the operation of other federal statutes,"' 4 the restrictions on alienation
in ERISA may preempt state law, but do not prevent federal bankruptcy law
from including the pension benefits in the bankruptcy estate.49
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Gof 0 considered "the
overall congressional scheme embodied in the Bankruptcy Code,"5' as well
as the legislative history in determining that "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
was a limited reference to spendthrift trusts enforceable under state law.52
The debtors in Goff argued that their self-employed retirement (Keogh) plans
were excluded from property of the estate because the plans were qualified
under ERISA.53 The court reasoned that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" did
not include federal law because Congress mentioned "'federal law' or pension
laws, including ERISA, when federal as opposed to state law [was] the subject
of reference."54 The court also noted that ERISA stated that it did not affect
other federal law.55 The court found that the debtors' Keogh plans did not
qualify as spendthrift trusts under state law because the plans were self-settled,
and therefore the plans were property of the bankruptcy estate.56
In Lichstrahl v. Banker's Trust (In re Lichstrahl),57 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals dealt with a debtor's interest in ERISA qualified pension
plans established by the debtor's professional association. The debtor was the
sole director, officer, stockholder, and for most of the time since incorporation
of the association, the sole employee. 58 The association was the settlor of
46. 873 F.2d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989).
47. Id. at 1124-25.
48. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1273. ERISA provides that "[n]othing in this subchapter
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of
the United States... or any rule or regulation issued under any such law." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(d) (1988).
49. Graham, 726 F.2d at 1273.
50. 706 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1983).
51. Id. at 582.
52. Id. at 589.
53. Id. at 577.
54. Id. at 582.
55. Id. at 587. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
56. Goff, 706 F.2d at 589.
57. 750 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 1489.
1991]
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the plans and had the power to amend or terminate the plans5 9 The court
relied on the legislative history of section 541(c)(2) and on decisions in other
circuits to determine that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" referred to state
spendthrift trust law.6° The court held that the plans did not qualify as
spendthrift trusts under state law because the debtor had the power to
terminate the trust, even though the debtor's power was as the sole officer and
director of the association.6 '
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously addressed this issue
in part in McLean v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund (In re McLean).62 In McLean, the court refused to limit the term
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" to "traditional" spendthrift trusts. 6  The
court determined that the ERISA qualified plan in question also qualified as
a spendthrift trust under state law, and therefore was excluded under section
541(c)(2). 4 Because the plan qualified as a spendthrift trust under state law,
the c6urt did not decide whether "applicable nonbankruptcy law" included
ERISA.
In circuits where the courts of appeals have not addressed this issue,
several federal district courts and bankruptcy courts have interpreted
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include ERISA.65 These courts have
generally relied on the plain language of section 541(c)(2) to decide that the
debtor's interest in ERISA qualified pension plans was excluded from property
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1490.
61. Id.
62. 762 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1985).
63. Id. at 1207. The court noted that there was no requirement in the statute for
a "traditional" trust or a definition of what might constitute a "traditional" trust. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Mosley, 42 Bankr. at 191; Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons (In re Phillips),
34 Bankr. 543, 544 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); Clottelti v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re
Threewitt), 24 Bankr. 927, 929 (D. Kan. 1982). But see In re Gribben, 84 Bankr. 494,
497 (S.D. Ohio 1988); In re Velis, 109 Bankr. 64, 68 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) aft'd, 123
Bankr. 497 (D.N.J. 1991).
In Velis, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey reconsidered the
issues decided in Mosley. The court in Velis was faced with self-settled ERISA
qualified plans and found that ERISA did not always create a valid restraint on
alienation. The court relied on Graham and Goff in narrowly construing "applicable
nonbankruptcy law." The court stated, however, that by "interpreting § 541(c)(2) to
include ERISA, 'as in Mosley, the present case is an example that ERISA
anti-alienation provisions do not per se create an enforceable restriction on the transfer
of a beneficial interest of the debtor in the retirement trusts." Veils, 109 Bankr. at 68.
[Vol. 56
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of the estate.6 The district court in Clottetti v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp. (In re
Threewitt)f stated:
[s]ince Congress did not choose to use the term "spendthrift trust" in the
language of the section itself, there is no reason to suppose that when the
term appears in the legislative history it should be taken as a term of art;
it is more reasonable to suppose that the term should be given its ordinary,
more general meaning as "inclusive of all trusts which bar creditors from
reaching a beneficiary's interest."8
In Threewitt, one of the debtors had participated for over six years in an
ERISA qualified pension plan created by his employer.69 Under the plan,
beneficiaries who had participated in the plan for more than five years could
make "unrestricted withdrawals from the Plan, or borrow against their interest
in the Plan."70  The court considered and rejected the argument that a
comparison of section 522(d)(10)(E) and section 541(c)(2) indicated a
congressional intent to include pension plans in property of the estate and then
allow an exemption for part of the plan.71 The court reasoned that since
section 522(d)(10)(E) exempted a wide range of pension plans, and not just
plans that cannot be reached by general creditors, it did not follow that
Congress intended all pension plans to become property of the estate.72 The
court did "not consider it remarkable that Congress did not bother to further
complicate an already complex code by taking pains to insure that there was
no overlap between Section 522(d)(10)(E) and Section 541(c)(2)."73
The bankruptcy court in Mosley considered that Congress' purpose in
enacting ERISA was to remove the effects of state law from qualified
pensions.74 The court reasoned that to give a narrow interpretation to the
term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" would allow state law to affect ERISA
qualified plans and decided that such an intent was unlikely.75
66. Phillips, 34 Bankr. at 545; Threewitt, 24 Bankr. at 929.
67. 24 Bankr. 927 (D. Kan. 1982).
68. Id. at 929 (citing 76 AM. JR. 2D Trusts § 148 (1975)).
69. Id. at 928.
70. Id. (footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 929-30.
72. Id. at 930.
73. Id.
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The court in Moore determined that the broad language, "applicable
nonbankruptcy law," could not be reconciled with a narrow interpretation that
only included state spendthrift trusts.76 The court believed that Congress
intended exactly what it said: that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" meant all
nonbankruptcy law, including both state and federal law.' Other uses of the
term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" in the Code apply to federal as well as
state law, and the court found no reason to interpret similar sections of the
same code differently. 78 Further, the court noted that when Congress wished
to refer only to state law, it did so explicitly.79 The court explained that this
interpretation of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was consistent with its earlier
decision in McLean.80
The court distinguished Moore from cases decided by other circuits,
stating that the other cases involved self-settled trusts,8' while the beneficia-
ries in this case did not have the power to control, amend, make unrestricted
withdrawals from, or borrow against the Plans.82 The court explained that
decisions in other circuits were based on the legislative history of the Code,
which this court found irrelevant because the language of section 541(c)(2)
was clear.83 Furthermore, this court found the legislative history of section
541(c)(2) ambiguous. The House of Representatives Report and the Senate
Report interpreted the section as "continuing" and "preserving" the exclusion
of spendthrift trusts from property of the estate.84 The court found that this
only indicated a congressional desire to include spendthrift trusts in "applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law," not to limit the meaning of that term.?s
76. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1477.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1477-78.
79. Id. at 1478. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(c)(2), 522(b)(1), 522(b)(2) (1988).
80. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
The court in McLean was not faced with the issue of whether "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law" included ERISA because it determined that the ERISA plan in question
qualified as a spendthrift trust under state law. McLean, 762 F.2d at 1207.
81. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1478.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1478-79. The court cited Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489
U.S. 803 (1989), and Burlington Northern R.R. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S.
454 (1987), for the rule that the court did not have the "authority to limit the scope of
a clear statutory term by recourse to the views of a legislative subgroup." Moore, 907
F.2d at 1479.
84. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1479. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
85. Moore, 907 F.2d at 1479.
[Vol. 56
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Finally, the court determined that ERISA contained enforceable
restrictions on transfer and there was a strong public policy against alienation
of ERISA plan benefits.' Since ERISA contained enforceable restrictions
on transfer, it constituted "applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section
541(c)(2).7 Therefore, it would be enforceable against the trustee in
bankruptcy.8 The court reasoned that this holding prevented the potential
problem of a trustee in bankruptcy disqualifying a plan from tax exempt status
by requiring the turnover of a single participant's interest.8 9
V. RECENT DECISIONS
Moore has already affected how other courts interpret "applicable
nonbankruptcy law." The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Forbes v. Lucas
(In re Lucas)90 recently considered whether ERISA qualified as "applicable
nonbankruptcy law." The court stated that "[i]t is an axiom of statutory
construction that resort to legislative history is improper when a statute is
unambiguous,"9 and found that the language of section 541(c)(2) is unambigu-
ous.92 The court was persuaded by the reasoning in Moore that. including
ERISA within the meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" was consistent
with the plain language of the statute and that the legislative history was
inconclusive.93 The court further found that ERISA did create an enforceable
restriction on alienation.94 The court therefore agreed with Moore that
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" includes ERISA and that this result harmo-
nized the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA.95
In John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Watson (In re Kincaid),96 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals again considered whether ERISA qualified as
86. Id. at 1480.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1481. This problem could arise because tax exempt status depends
upon the plan being qualified under ERISA. The plan must contain the required anti-
alienation provisions to be qualified under ERISA, but if these provisions are violated
the plan may lose its qualification. See also John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Watson (In re Kincaid), 917 F.2d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 1990) (Fletcher, J., concurring);
McLean, 762 F.2d at 1206.
90. 924 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1991).
91. Id. at 600.
92. Id. at 601.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 603.
95. Id.
96. 917 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1990).
1991]
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"applicable nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2). The court admitted
there was some "incongruity in the notion that only ERISA's anti-alienation
provisions offer protection until bankruptcy, and only state spendthrift
provisions do so in bankruptcy." 97 The court reaffirmed its decision in
Daniel v. Security Pacific Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel)98 that "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" only encompassed spendthrift trusts, but found that the
plans in question qualified as spendthrift trusts under state law.99 Judge
Fletcher concurred in the judgment, but expressed doubts about the validity
of Daniel."'" Judge Fletcher agreed with Moore that the language "applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law" clearly referred to all nonbankruptcy law and there
was no reason to resort to the legislative history.1 '1
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas in In re
Majul'02 also considered the meaning of "applicable nonbankruptcy law."
The debtors were beneficiaries of ERISA qualified pension plans created by
the closely-held professional corporation of one of the debtors."' 3 The court
stated that the facts closely resembled Brooks v. Interflrst Bank (In re
Brooks)"4 and Goff, decisions by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 105
The bankruptcy court considered United States Supreme Court, circuit courts
of appeal and bankruptcy court cases decided after Goff and Brooks.1 6 The
court believed that Guidry indicated a broad construction of the anti-alienation
provisions found in section 1056(d)(1) of ERISA, and indicated "a policy
prohibition against assignment or alienation of pension benefits."'0 7 The
court also agreed with Moore that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is clear and
there was no need to resort to the legislative history, which was "at best,
cloudy, and that Congress [knew] the difference between 'state law' and
97. Id. at 1166.
98. 771 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1985).
99. Kincaid, 917 F.2d at 1166, 1168.
100. Id. at 1169.
101. Id. Judge Fletcher also found that the purpose of ERISA and the language
used in ERISA "indicate that it properly constitutes 'applicable nonbankruptcy law."'
Id. at 1169-70. Judge Fletcher found that the holding in Daniel created a clash
between the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA. This clash raised a problem by severely
disrupting the protections granted by ERISA. As a result, the judge believed that
Daniel should be reconsidered. Id. at 1170.
102. 119 Bankr. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
103. Id. at 119.
104. 844 F.2d 258 (5th Cir. 1988) (reaffirming the court's earlier decision in
Goff).
105. Majul, 119 Bankr. at 119.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 121-22.
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'applicable nonbankruptcy law.""l  The court reasoned that the Bankruptcy
Code and ERISA could best be harmonized by including ERISA as "applica-
ble nonbankruptcy law" under section 541(c)(2). The court disagreed with
Goff and Brooks, and held that ERISA qualified pension plans, even when
self-settled, should be excluded from property of the bankruptcy estate."°
VI. CONCLUSION
The reasoning used by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is clear and
compelling. The term "applicable nonbankruptcy law" as found in section
541(c)(2) of the Code should mean exactly what it says and a court should not
consider any legislative history to the contrary. Further, references in the
legislative history to spendthrift trusts only indicate an intention to include
spendthrift trusts within "applicable nonbankruptcy law," not an intention to
limit that phrase."0 This interpretation preserves Congress' intent about
both ERISA and the Bankruptcy Code. Congress intended to remove the
effects of state law from qualified pensions."' Making state law the
benchmark for determining whether a trust is excluded from property of the
estate would give state law control over the status of ERISA qualified trusts
and undermine the congressional intent to place pension plans under federal
control." The argument relied on in Graham that ERISA is explicitly
made subject to contrary federal law, and the Bankruptcy Code therefore
controls, fails when section 541(c)(2) is given its clear meaning. ERISA
creates a restriction on alienation that is enforceable outside of bankrupt-
cy." 3  There is no conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA if
"applicable nonbankruptcy law" is given its common meaning because the
Bankruptcy Code recognizes the restrictions on alienation created by ERISA.
A comparison of section 541(c)(2) and section 522(d)(10) also reveals
that a narrow construction of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" is not required.
The analysis in In re Threewitt, that section 522(d)(10) exempts a wide range
of benefits, is helpful.14 The Bankruptcy Code is complicated, and a slight
overlap between two sections should not affect the plain language of either
section.
108. Id. at 123 (footnote omitted).
109. Id. at 124.
110. See supra notes 41, 84-85 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. See also Note, Corporate
Pension Plans as Property of the Bankruptcy Estate, 69 MINN L. REV. 1113, 1120
(1985).
113. See Guidry, 110 S. Ct. at 685.
114. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
1991]
13
Rollings: Rollings: Debtor's Interest in ERISA Funds
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOUPJ LAW REVIEW
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that many of the contrary
decisions involved self-settled trusts."' Those courts presumably believed
that it was not equitable to exclude the trust from property of the estate when
the debtor had almost complete access to the corpus of the trust. This
approach does not supply a reason to construe a statute narrowly when it is
clear on its face. Discussing a similar point, the Supreme Court in Guidry
stated that "there may be a natural distaste for the result we reach here. The
statute, however, is clear.
116
Excluding self-settled pension plans from property of the estate appears
unfair because the beneficiary has a large amount of control over the trust.
If Congress does not like this result, Congress can change the statute so that
self-settled ERISA qualified plans are part of the bankruptcy estate.117 The
self-settled pension plans could then be exempted from property of the
bankruptcy estate to the extent reasonably necessary for support of the debtor
or the debtor's dependents under section 522(d)(10). Similarly, if Congress
does not want to exclude any ERISA qualified plans from property of the
bankruptcy estate, Congress can change the phrase "applicable nonbankruptcy
law" to "applicable state law. '118 In either of these cases, Congress would
also need to create an exception in ERISA's anti-alienation provisions for any
funds that are not excluded or exempted from property of the bankruptcy
115. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
116. Guidry, 110 S. Ct. at 688 (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988 &
Supp. I 1989) of ERISA). The same rationale applies to the phrase "applicable
nonbankruptcy law" under § 541(c)(2).
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas has noted that:
It also seems incongruous that an imprisoned embezzler in Guidry received
protection of his pension plan benefits, while an innocent, but insolvent,
debtor in bankruptcy would not receive the ERISA anti-alienation
protection. Surely Congress did not intend, and the United States Supreme
Court would not permit, such inconsistent results in light of ERISA's policy
objectives.
In re Majul, 119 Bankr. 118, 123 fi.5 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
117. Section 541(c)(2) could be amended to read as follows:
A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust
that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law (including the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974) is enforceable in a case
under this title provided, however, that a restriction on the transfer of a
beneficial interest in a self-settled pension plan will not be enforceable
under this title.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text for the text of § 541(c)(2) in its present
form.
118. Benefits under an ERISA qualified pension plan could then be exempted out
of property of the bankruptcy estate to the extent reasonably necessary for the support
of the debtor or the debtor's dependents under § 522(d)(10).
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estate so ERISA qualified plans do not lose qualification because of the
transfer of the funds." 9
The purpose of ERISA will be better served if the restrictions on transfer
found in ERISA qualified plans continue to be enforceable in bankruptcy, as
Moore held. Congress chose to protect a source of income so it will be
available upon retirement." Including ERISA within "applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law" will continue the protection of that source of income. Creditors
can not gain access to qualified pension benefits in State law proceedings, 21
and the result should not be different under the Bankruptcy Code.
Moore should mark the beginning of a new trend in the interpretation of
section 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. The result in cases dealing with
self-settled ERISA pension plans may seem inequitable, but the statute is
clear. Congress, and not the courts, should make any exception to the clear
language of the statute."2
RICHARD ROLLINGS, JR.
119. Congress needs to create an exception in ERISA's anti-alienation provisions
since many courts are interpreting "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to not include
ERISA. If every circuit court of appeals followed Moore, there would be no need for
any statutory changes to ERISA unless § 541(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is changed.
120. See Guidry, 110 S. Ct. at 687.
121. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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